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The pre-transition industrial structure in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union was
primarily driven by a raw material base, influenced by central planning decisions and
rarely based on comparative advantage considerations. In the Soviet Union in particular,
enterprises were highly integrated into an industrial network and thus were largely
dependent on supplies of raw materials from other parts of the region.  Following the
collapse of the socialist system and the resolution of CMEA, the trade and supply links
broke up virtually overnight and what might have been an economically viable
production network - a very strong assumption to make concerning soviet-era industrial
giants - turned out to be making huge losses on public accounts.  Industrial enterprises
which were almost never involved in marketing and distribution of their products
suddenly found themselves in an environment where they had to make their own
production decisions and adjust to new economic conditions. These developments
coupled with deteriorating macroeconomic conditions drastically changed the enabling
environment for industrial sector enterprises.
From the initial years of transition, countries of Eastern Europe and former Soviet
Union have faced the challenge of industrial restructuring and growth.  Various sub-
sector programs defining 'strategic directions'  of development were designed and put in
place.  Yet quite often policy responses were limited to protectionist measures aimed at
preserving output and/or employment of (mostly still state owned) industrial enterprises.
Bearing in mind the political importance of large industrial firms, in most cases
governments were reluctant to liquidate them, hence effectively allowing them to
continue running losses.  Moreover, in cases where enterprises were considered
important, direct state subsidies and credits were made available.  This resulted in
2situations where state owned enterprises were subjected to very little or no financial
discipline - an unlikely goal of any industrial policy in the region.
Here we do not intend to discuss specific details of any industrial policy in
transition economies.  Neither do we focus on the role the conventional determinants of
industrial policy (e.g. trade and exchange rate regimes, investment and capital
accumulation, etc.) played in shaping the outcomes of those policies.  Our intention here
is to introduce yet another channel through which industrial policymakers In Transition
Economies are likely to be able to affect industrial growth.
Following recent studies on economic growth, and in particular those exploring the
link between institutional quality and economic growth in general (e.g. Knack and Keefer
11995],  Clague et al. [1995]) we attempt to test the relationship between industrial
growth and institutional quality indicators.  Owing to the lack of sufficiently long time
series and relatively poor quality of data, we did not base our analysis on transition
economies.  Instead we used a sample of 27 developing countries of Asia and Latin
2 America containing data from 1982 to 1997 to derive our conclusions . We present
evidence of a strong effect of various indicators of institutional quality and financial
development on industrial growth. We then hypothesize that the results obtained in the
paper will hold for a wide range of transition/developing countries.
The paper is structured in the following way.  Section II establishes the theoretical
link between quality of institutions and growth.  Section III goes on to describe the
institutional quality indicators to be used in the study.  We then outline the basic
2 Latin American countries are: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama,
Paraguay, Uruguay.  Asian countries are: Bangladesh, China, Hong Kong (China), India,
Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, Nepal, Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand
3econometric model and discuss regression results in Section IV. Finally, Section V
contains concluding remarks and predictions.
II. Quality of Institutions and Economic Growth
It is only relatively recently that economists have attempted to explain the fraction of
growth otherwise unexplained by simple factor accumulation by emphasizing the
importance of increasing returns to human capital (e.g. Lucas (1988), Romer (1986,
1988)), technological change (e.g. Solow (1956)), ownership (e.g. Morck et al. (1988),
McConnell and Servaes (1990)), etc.  On the other hand, Olson (1982), North (1990),
Clague and Rausser (1991) among others reiterated the vitality of building up adequate
legal infrastructure and proper functioning institutions in promoting economic growth.
Arguments in favor of strong institutional structure are numerous: (1) transaction costs
associated with running business are likely to increase in the presence of corruption and
bureaucratic obstacles; (2) barriers to entry and exit might become very high without a
clear and transparent legal and regulatory mechanisms governing entry and exit;  and (3)
gains from trade are easier to realize when transactions are carried out through efficiently
functioning market mechanisms.  On a similar note, Scully (1988) writes that "life,
liberty and property are not additively separable attributes; the diminution of one
diminishes all.  Security of rights affects their value."  Clague et al. (1995) in turn
emphasize irreversibility of commitments as essential for multiple-party contracts.
Perhaps the grand summary argument brought forward in favor of a developed legal
system and mechanisms of contract enforcement is that markets are less likely to exist
when property rights and contract enforcement are absent or inadequate.
The quality of institutions and legal framework are also likely to affect growth
through the ability of financial sector to channel resources to finance productive
4activities.  In the absence of an adequate regulatory framnework  and supervision the ability
of domestic banks to mobilize funds will be strongly underrnined by a lack of depositors'
confidence.  This will drift funds abroad and generally away from viable domestic
investment opportunities.  On the other hand, under inefficient property rights and an
underdeveloped system of title registration, realizing liquidity from collateral can be quite
costly.  This has a potential of undermining financial institutions'  ability to lend to the
extent they could, had they faced better property rights legislation and enforcement.
Exploring the link between quality of institutions and financial depth, La Porta et al.
(1997) summarize: "To the extent that better legal protections enable the financiers to
offer entrepreneurs money at better terms, ...  countries with better legal protection should
have more external finance in the form of both higher valued and broader capital
markets".
A growing body of empirical literature has tried to incorporate various indicators of
institutional quality, civil liberties and the legal framework into conventional growth
equations.  Kormendi and Meguire (1985), and Scully (1988) find a strong effect of the
Gastil civil liberties index on rates of investment and economic growth.  A World Bank
study by Brunetti, Kisunko and Weder (1997) finds that the differences between
institutional frameworks (as perceived by private sector agents) in Transition countries
may account for differences in countries' relative economic performance.  La Porta et al.
(1997) find strong evidence that the legal environment (measured by an indicator of Rule
of Law) and institutional quality have a significant effect on the size of capital markets
for their sample of 49 countries.
It is rather simple to make a point about an even stronger link between institutional
quality factors and industrial growth.  Bearing in mind the nature of industrial
technological process, few would disagree that the industrial sector on average requires
5longer term contractual agreements, larger capital investments and more numerous
supplier (and maybe even customer) links.  Hence there is a stronger need for a more
adequate legal and regulatory framework to enforce multiple-party and/or longer term
contracts.  Although being a public good by nature, it might perhaps be useful to look at
quality of institutions and law enforcement as an input to production.  Then our earlier
point can be rephrased with "the more a production process relies upon suppliers, sources
of credit, and technological innovations, the more institutional-qualitxy-intensive  the
production process becomes."  Subsequently, scarcity of this one input makes it harder,
sometimes even impossible, to invest and engage in productive activities the more
institutional-quality-intensive the production process is.  In what follows, the effect of
developed institutions and contract enforcement on growth will be at least as pronounced
in industry as it is in other sectors.  Without testing the hypothesis of the relative
importance of institutional quality on various sectors in the economy, the paper
contributes to the empirical growth literature in that it establishes empirically the
relationship between a broad range of institutional quality indicators and industrial
growth.
III. Institutional Quality Variables
The dataset containing measures of institutional quality and contract enforcement to be
used in our study was assembled by the IRIS Center of the University of Maryland from
the International Country Risk Guide - a monthly publication of Political Risk Services
(PRS).  The five PRS indicators used in the study are Government Repudiation of
Contracts, Risk of Expropriation, Corruption, Rule of Law, and Bureaucratic Quality.
For all five measures, the lower (higher) values indicate worse (better) standing.
6Indicator  Scale  Notation
Government  repudiation  of contracts  0-10  PRSI
Risk of expropriation  0-10  PRS2
Corruption  0-6  PRS3
Rule of Law  0-6  PRS4
Bureaucratic  quality  0-6  PRS5
Government repudiation of contracts is an indicator of institutional quality which
addresses the possibility that foreign businesses, contractors, and consultants face the risk
of a modification in a contract taking the form of repudiation, postponement, or scaling
down. A country may initiate contract modification with a foreign business because of an
income drop, budget cuts, political pressure, or a change in government economic and
social priorities. Risk of expropriation of private foreign investments assesses the
likelihood of confiscation or nationalization.  Both indicators proxy the government's
ability to enforce contracts and not to renege on its promises. Even if private agents
engage in mutual beneficial exchange or investment, it is worth noting that at least in
theory they still face the risk of the government expropriating the results of their
exchange.  The channel through which we expect repudiation and expropriation risks to
affect investment and growth is straightforward: should the likelihood of  repudiations
and expropriations be high, rational private agents will discount the future streams of
income from investment at a higher rate which ceteris paribus could lead to lower
aggregate investment and slower economic growth.
The PRS indicators of Corruption and Bureaucratic Quality are intended to
measure the corruption and strength of bureaucratic apparatus of the government
respectively.  Corruption and bureaucratic quality are viewed as impediments to
investment and growth primarily because they have a potential of distorting the economic
and financial environment by increasing the transaction costs faced by economic agents.
7The most common forms of corruption and bureaucratic barriers met directly by firms are
demands for special payments and bribes connected with import and export licenses,
exchange controls, tax assessments, police protection, or loans. Such corruption can make
it difficult to conduct business effectively, and in some cases may force the withdrawal or
withholding of investments.
The Rule of Law indicator measures the soundness of political institutions, strength
of court system, and provisions for an orderly succession of power. This indicator reflects
the extent to which economic agents are willing to accept the established institutions to
make and implement laws and arbitrate disputes. A high risk point total means that there
is a strong law and order tradition, while a low risk point total means there is a tradition
of depending on physical force or illegal means to settle claims.  The country distribution
of PRS indicators is presented in Table 1.
IV. The Model
Assuming an endogenous growth model, Barro (1991) and Keefer and Knack (1995)
define their cross-country growth regression equation as follows:
In(-  YT  8  +  ln(yio)  + ,82 In(educ  1)  +  ()
Yio
where ln(yQ)  is (logarithm of) initial level of per capita output, and ln(educ) is (logarithm
of) average education indicator.  Including a measure of initial per capita output intends
to capture the phenomenon of declining marginal product (assumed for a conventional
neoclassical production function) which is instrumental in establishing the (conditional)
convergence to a steady-state output per capita across countries.  Replacing general
economic output with industrial value added and introducing institutional quality
indicators to Equation I yields:
8In(VA  ')  = ,o  + 8,3  ln(IVA 82 ,)+  l6 2 ln(educi)  +±6 3 PRS,  +  e,  (2)
IVA 82,i
where ln(IVA97)  and ln(IVA82) are (natural logarithms of) per capita industrial value
added in 1997 and 1982 respectively, PRS is Institutional Quality indicator, and e is the
error term. (Subscript i indicates country).
OLS  Result
Yet the above equations suffer from a major drawback: they are derived under a
simplifying assumption that rates of factor accumulation are the same across countries
(see Keefer and Knack (1995) for a discussion).  Following Mankiw et al. (1992) and
bearing in mind that under certain assumptions the rate of growth of capital and
investment rate are linearly related, we include the ratio of investment to GDP to proxy
the rate of capital accumulation 3. Yet we believe there is another rationale behind
including investment to GDP ratio into Equation 2. Treating investment as a forward
looking measure of investment confidence, we believe that by the introduction of
investment rate we also capture other institutional quality related phenomena, which are
not necessarily reflected in the above PSR indicators (such as expected changes in
investment climate, investor confidence, etc.).  Below we use total economy-wide
investment to proxy for investments into industrial sector, differences in savings habits,
and (expected) investment climate across countries.  Thus including investment rate in
Equation 2 generates:
'It  can be shown that the per capita capital stock evolves in a following way:
AK/ic  =/i  +  n  -
where  y - investment  to output ratio (I/Y),  pt - capital  to output ratio  (K/Y),  n - rate  of
population growth, and 6 - average rate of depreciation in the economy.  So under the
assumption of a fixed capital to output ratio, there exists a linear relationship between the
rate of growth of per capita capital stock and the investment rate.
91VA97.
ln(  V  ) =,60  + Al 1ln(IVA82 1) + Ih2  ln(edu;) + j3  ln(I  / GDP,)  + / 4PRSJ + e,  (3)
IVA82,
where ln(I/GDP) is the (natural logarithm of the) ratio of aggregate gross fixed
investment to GDP.  Estimates based on the above equation are reported in Table 2.
Specifications 1 through 6 contain PRS variables 1 through 5 and a composite measure of
those indexes in each respective equation 4. With the exception of Institutional Quality
indicators, all other variables used in the analysis are from the Statistical Information
Management and Analysis (SIMA) database of the World Bank.
The coefficients of primary interest are all positive and comfortably significant.
The coefficients on the (logarithm of the) investment rate are positive and significant,
rejecting the hypothesis that the rate of capital accumulation are identical across
countries. The choice of measure of human capital (or education) turned out to be a
crucial one here. We hypothesized that unlike the case of economic growth in general,
higher education is more important for industrial growth than secondary education. The
results support our proposition.  In most regressions the average Secondary School
Enrollment ratio failed to provide the sings (and significance) of coefficients predicted by
theory5. Owing to the lack of reliable data on High Education we included the (logarithm
of the) Tertiary Enrollment rate as an explanatory variable to capture the effect of human
4 The composite measure of PRS variables included in the 6th  regression is a simple
average of PRS variables lthrough 5. Note that including the PRS Composite measure in
an equation is identical to including all 5 PRS variables into the regression and restricting
their coefficients to be the same for all 5 variables.
5 In another attempt to improve the "performance" of educational indicators, we included
Government Educational Expenses (reported by UNESCO) as an explanatory variable.
Doing so improved the results but only marginally. The probable cause, we believe, is
that (in poor countries in particular) educational expenses might be somewhat biased
towards Secondary Education (and against Higher Education and subsequently R&D).
Should this be the case the educational expenses would only give us very limited
information about the true distribution of Education in the country and thus will not be
able to capture the true effect of education on industrial growth.
10capital. The results suggest that post-secondary Education (measured here by Tertiary
Enrollment) is at least as important as Secondary Education. Overall, four independent
variables included in each regression were able to explain from 62 to 75 percent of
variations in the explanatory variable.
Two Stage Approach
However, it might be argued that Equation 3 suffers from a simultaneity problem
introduced by the possible endogeneity of investment with respect to (industrial) growth 6.
We utilize the Two-Stage (2SLS) estimation procedure to account for the potential
endogeneity of the investment rate.  To emphasize the importance of institutional quality
variables for investment in the long run, we chose initial (1982) values of PRS indicators
as instruments to explain the average rate of investment 7. We call so-
estimated/instrumented values of investment rate the institutional component of the
8 investment rate . We then used the institutional component of investment rate in the
second stage regression.  Results of the second stage estimation are reported in Table 39.
6 Yet we argue that the extent of potential bias is lessened in our regressions because of
the fact that we use economy-wide investment (as opposed to investment into industrial
sector alone) in the equations.
7 It can be shown that even if the explanatory variable is not endogenous by itself,
averaging both dependent and independent variables across time biases OLS estimates of
coefficients and standard errors. This also imposes a limitation on the choice of
instruments in cases where the variable to be instrumented is time averaged - instruments
used in first-stage regression thus cannot be time averaged.
8 The first stage regression of the (logarithm of the) average investmnent-to-GDP  ratio on
initial values of all 5 PRS indicators provided a remarkable fit: R-squared equals 0.51,
indicating that over 50 percent of variation in investment ratio (in the long run) is
explained by the institutional quality variables alone. F-statistic of zero slopes in the 1"
stage regression is 4.22, with critical value F [5,21] for 5 percent confidence level being
just below 2.7.
9A  skeptical reader could argue for potential multicolinearity (introduced by use of
averaged PRS indicators in a specification where the investment rate is instrumented with
initial values of PRS).  To argue against any serious bias as a result, we run a second
11We focus on the most important ones here.  It becomes clear that the signs and
significance of the coefficients on institutional quality variables are robust with respect to
the estimation procedure: all coefficients are significant at least on a 5 percent confidence
level with the exception of coefficient on corruption, in which case the t statistic is only
slightly below the 5 percent critical value.  Coefficients on Tertiary Education appear
significant and imply somewhat larger returns on education than in previous regressions.
The above specification predicts a larger rate of conversion to a common cross-country
steady state of per capita industrial output than that suggested by previous specifications.
Another set of findings is worth paying special attention to: the results above
suggest that developed legal and regulatory framework positively influences industrial
growth both through investment and total factor productivity.  To put it differently, the
fact that after controlling for an estimated rate of investment, coefficients on PRS
indicators remain strong (see Table 3), suggests that institutional quality affects both the
amount of investment in the economy as well as the efficiency of resource allocation (at
least in the industrial sector).
It can be inferred from the regression results that ceteris paribus a one percent
increase in per capita industrial value added can be achieved by either a 7.7 percent
increase in the level of Tertiary Enrollment or a 2.2 percent increase in the rate of
investmentl'.  Our findings are not significantly different from those of Mankiw et al.
(1992) who report the elasticity of per capita output growth with respect to the investment
stage regression without including PRS indicators.  The outcome of the regression is
summarized below:
Dep. Var. =  -1.6  - 0.16*Log(Initial) + 0.8*Log(TerEdu) + 0.092*Est. Log(I/GDP); R 2 =0.45
(-2.31)  (-2.32)  (0.86)  (3.08)
The results are consistent with those reported in Table 3 and if contrasted with the latter
can hardly be viewed as indicative of multicollinearity.
10  Reported elasticities are based on the sixth specification, i.e. where the PRS Composite
measure is used.
12rate for their samnple  of 98 non-oil producing countries to be around 0.5.  Finally,
including all five institutional quality variables and restricting their coefficients to be the
same improves the regression fit (see equation 6).
At this stage we foresee arguments against using contemporaneous values of
institutional quality measures to explain the variations in the industrial growth. This is the
same as saying that industrial growth in turn may be causing improvements in the
underlying institutional quality measures.  Although we formally account for possible
endogeneity of these variables below, we dismiss these arguments (at least partially)
based on the fact that (albeit correlated with general economic growth) industrial growth
alone is unlikely to generate major changes in the legal system, contract enforcement and
level of corruption.  To check for possible endogeneity in the institutional quality
variables, a robustness test of the results with respect to the (timing of the) institutional
variables was conducted.  We did so by including initial (1982) values of PRS indicators
in the above specification, which does not change the qualitative importance of the results
and changes the magnitudes and significance pattern of the coefficients only
marginally".
To check the robustness of our results with respect to different measures of
Institutional  Quality, we introduced yet another measure of institutional quality - the
Contract-Intensive Money ratio.  Introduced by Clague et al. (1995) as the ratio of non-
cash balances within M2 2, the measure intends to quantify contract enforcement and
property rights.  We report these results in Table 4.  They appear to go along the lines of
" The results of those regressions are available from the authors upon request.
12 The ratio is defined as (M2-Cash)/M2.  Cash (Currency in circulation outside of banks)
is line 14a of IMF's International Financial Statistics.  M2 is the summation of line 34
(Money) and line 35 (Quasi-Money) of IMF's International Financial Statistics.
13our earlier findings where PRS indicators were used as regressors.  The rate of
conversion to a common steady state is greater when CIM is being controlled for.
V. Conclusion
Using the experience of 27 Developing countries of Asia and Latin America, we
attempted to answer the question posed in the title of this paper.  We found significant
evidence of the effect of institutional quality and legal indicators on industrial growth in
Asian and Latin American countries included in the sample. Measures of Institutional
Quality turned out to have a very strong positive effect on the rate of industrial growth.
In addition, we found that a developed legal and regulatory framework, good
enforcement and low administrative barriers affect the industrial growth not only by
increasing the amount of investments made available in the economy but also by
improving the efficiency of resource allocation.  It is important to note that our findings
are robust to controlling for possible endogeneity of the rate of investment.  Most
importantly, results are independent of the type of Institutional Quality measures used in
the analysis. Qualitative conclusions are also unchanged when initial (rather than time
averaged) values of institutional quality variables are used as explanatory variables.
Having documented this, we turn to the policy implications of our results.
Empirical and anecdotal evidence from developing countries suggest that governments
seldom lack the capacity to design and implement full-fledged industrial policies using
traditional determinants such as trade, tax and foreign exchange regimes without
introducing major distortions, generating sizable costs and providing disincentives for
entrepreneurs to engage in productive activities in some areas.  Instead of going as far as
rejecting the merits of those policies, we propose using a complementary set of measures
that can be applied universally and with minimum distortions across various sectors in
14the economy and industrial sector in particular.  Our research suggests that policy makers
should devote resources and efforts to reducing corruption, eliminating bureaucratic
barriers, improving contract enforcement and the legal environment. Separate attention
should be given to measures which are capable of deepening the financial sector,
improving financial sector infrastructure and increasing the efficiency of financial
transactions.
It should also be noted that we are far from suggesting that ongoing policies be put
on hold in favor of new ones directed at improving measures of Institutional Quality.
Instead, in the light of our results, we suggest that institution building in Transition
Countries be viewed as an essential complementary measure to accompany large scale
privatization, flow of public and private investments in education and R&D, and
measures promoting Foreign Direct Investment'3.
Finally, we hypothesize (without testing it here) that the marginal effect of
institutional improvements on industrial growth might, in fact, be stronger in Transition
economies (compared to Asian and Latin American countries), where traditions of market
oriented business institutions were virtually absent for decades - a proposition that can
be tested by further research.
13 In cases when technology and research offer positive externalities - such as increasing
returns to scale as presented by the new growth theories - we foresee space for a more
active industrial policy focused on investments in education and R&D.
15Table 1
Country Distribution of PRS Institutional Quality Indicators (averages for 1982-1995)
PRS1  PRS2  PRS3  PRS4  PRS5
Latin  America
Argentina  4.9  5.9  3.6  3.2  3.0
Bolivia  4.6  5.0  1.7  1.3  1.1
Brazil  6.3  7.6  3.8  3.8  4.0
Chile  6.8  7.5  3.2  4.2  3.4
Colombia  7.0  6.9  3.0  1.3  4.0
Costa  Rica  5.8  6.7  5.0  4.0  2.9
Dominican  Rep.  3.9  6.0  3.0  3.1  3.0
Ecuador  5.2  6.6  3.1  4.0  3.0
El Salvador  4.7  4.7  2.2  1.4  1.1
Honduras  5.2  5.0  2.0  2.1  1.6
Jamaica  6.5  6.7  2.1  2.1  3.0
Mexico  6.6  7.3  2.9  3.2  2.9
Panama  5.1  5.7  2.1  2.1  1.1
Paraguay  7.6  6.9  1.3  2.7  1.8
Uruguay  7.3  6.6  3.0  3.0  2.0
Average Latin America  5.82  6.34  2.80  2.77  2.52
Asia
Bangladesh  4.1  4.9  0.6  1.4  1.2
China  6.7  8.1  3.8  3.6  3.0
Hong Kong,  China  8.8  8.3  5.1  4.9  4.1
India  6.1  7.8  2.8  2.5  3.8
Indonesia  6.1  7.2  1.3  2.4  1.5
Korea,  Rep.  8.6  8.3  3.2  3.2  4.2
Malaysia  7.4  8.0  4.4  4.1  3.5
Nepal  - - - - -
Philippines  4.8  5.2  1.8  1.6  1.5
Singapore  8.9  9.3  4.9  5.1  5.1
SriLanka  5.3  6.1  3.0  1.1  3.0
Thailand  7.6  7.4  3.1  3.8  4.4
Average Asia  6.8  7.3  3.1  3.1  3.2
Average  All  6.21  6.75  2.92  2.90  2.82
16Table 2
OLS Regression Estimates with Rate of Investment Included
Dependent  Variable:  Log(IVA97)  - Log(IVA82)
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
Constant  -0.95  -0.79  -0.85  -0.67  -0.86  -0.45
Log(Initial)  -0.14**  -0.18**  -0.15**  -0.16**  -0.12**  -0.19**
(0.03)  (0.06)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.059)
Log(TerEdu)  0.08  0.12**  0.08  0.07  0.064  0.096*
(0.067)  (0.05)  (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.077)  (0.056)
Log(I/GDP)  0.44**  0.30**  0.47**  0.44**  0.46**  0.31**











Composite  0 I1*
(0.046)
R  2  0.66  0.75  0.67  0.66  0.62  0.74
N  23  23  23  23  23  23
**  - Indicates significance at 5% confidence level, and *  - significance at 10% confidence level. Standard
errors  in parenthesis. White's heteroskedasticity-consistent  variance-covariance  matrix  was used to
estimate  standard  errors.
IVA  = Industrial Value Added,
I/GDP  = Investment  to GDP ratio,
TerEdu  = Average  Tertiary  enrollment,
PRSI-5  = Values  of PRS  indicators  I through 5, averaged  for the period 1982-1995.
PRS  Composite  = Unweighted  average  of PRS  1-5  indicators
17Table 3
Two Stage Regression Estimates
Dependent Variable: Log(IVA97) - Log(IVA82)
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
Constant  -1.27  -1.07  -1.07  -0.83  -1.23  -0.75
Log(Initial)  -0.22**  -0.23**  -0.21  **  -0.23**  -0.21**  -0.26**
(0.04)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.052)  (0.052)  (0.047)
Log(TerEdu)  0.12*  0.16**  0.11  0.10  0.12*  0.13**
(0.066)  (0.05)  (0.09)  (0.09)  (0.066)  (0.056)
Est. Log(I/GDP)  0.60**  0.41*  0.62**  0.57**  0.66**  0.45**











PRS Composite  0.125**
(0.034)
R  2  0.63  0.75  0.58  0.60  0.65  0.75
N  23  23  23  23  23  23
** - Indicates significance at 5% confidence level, and * -significance at 10 0/o  confidence level. Standard
errors in  parenthesis. White's  heteroskedasticity-consistent  variance-covariance  matrix  was used  to
estimate  standard  errors.
IVA  = Industrial  Value  Added,
Est. Log(I/GDP)  = Instrumented  value  of ratio  of Investment  to GDP,
TerEdu  = Average  Tertiary  enrollment,
PRS1-5  = Values  of PRS  indicators  I through  5, averaged  for the period 1982-1995.
PRS Composite  = Unweighted  average  of PRS  1-5  indicators
18Table 4
Summary Regression Results with CIM Ratio
Dependent Variable: Log(IVA97) - Log(IVA82)
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
Constant  -1.21  -1.60  -1.89  -2.74
Log(Initial)  -0.09**  -0.16**  -0.12**  -0.18**
(0.04)  (0.068)  (0.046)  (0.065)
Log(TerEdu)  0.056  0.092  0.065  0.091
(0.08)  (0.106)  (0.09)  (0.099)
Log(I/GDP)  0.58**  0.54**
(0.13)  (0.105)
Est. Log(I/GDP)  0.80**  0.77**
(0.26)  (0.22)
CIM Ratio  1.16**  1.64**
(0.56)  (0.65)
R2  0.59  0.45  0.63  0.55
N  24  23  24  23
** - Indicates significance at 5% confidence level, and * - significance at 10% confidence level.
Standard  errors  in parenthesis.  White's  heteroskedasticity-consistent  variance-covariance  matrix
was  used to estimate  standard  errors.
IVA  = Industrial Value Added,
TerEdu  = Average  Tertiary  enrollment,
I/GDP  = Average  Investment  to GDP  ratio,
CIM  = Contract  Intensive  Money  ratio,  (M2-Cash)/M2,  averaged  for 1982-1997.
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